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ABSTRACT
We show how to construct adversarial examples for neural networks with exactly verified robustness
against `∞-bounded input perturbations by exploiting floating point error. We argue that any exact
verification of real-valued neural networks must accurately model the implementation details of any
floating point arithmetic used during inference or verification.
1 Introduction
It has been discovered that deep neural networks (DNNs) are susceptible to adversarial examples [1], which are
images indistinguishable to humans that cause a DNN to give substantially different results. There is a large body
of research on attacking (i.e., finding such adversarial examples) and defending neural networks [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
The robustness of a network on a specific input can be formally proved by adopting exact verification techniques,
mostly based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers [7, 8, 9, 10] or Mixed Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. An exact verification (a.k.a. complete verification) algorithm should either prove that a
specification is satisfied or produce a counter example that violates the specification. Another approach to provable
robustness is via inexact verification (a.k.a. certification) based on the idea of over-approximation, that may fail to
prove or disprove the desired properties in certain cases [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
In practice the computation of both the verifier and the neural network is performed on physical computers that use an
approximated representation of real numbers. Although it is theoretically possible to use exact arithmetic for DNN
verification, to achieve reasonable performance, the solvers use floating point arithmetic [9]. The use of floating point
arithmetic renders the solver inexact. The existence of multiple software and hardware systems for DNN inference,
such as accelerated convolution algorithms of FFT [25] or Winograd [26], further complicates the situation, because
different implementations exhibit different error characteristics. We are not aware of any efforts to ensure that the solver
error is completely aligned with the error of a particular inference implementation.
Floating point error has been accounted for in some certification frameworks [27] by maintaining upper and lower
rounding bounds for sound floating point arithmetic [28]. Such frameworks should be extensible to model numerical
error in implementations like Winograd convolution but the effectiveness of this extension remains to be studied. And
these techniques only aspire to verify an over-approximation of robustness.
On the contrary, very little attention has been paid to floating point error in the literature of exact verification of neural
networks. In this work, we argue that this issue should not be overlooked by presenting practical techniques to construct
adversarial examples for verified neural networks.
2 Problem Definition
Let NN (·, W ) denote the computation of a neural network with weight W . In this work we consider 2D image
classification problems. For an input image x ∈ Rm×n×c[0,1] which has m rows and n columns of pixels each containing
c color channels normalized to the range [0, 1], the logits vector y = NN (x, W ) ∈ Rk is a vector containing the
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classification scores for each of the k classes. The class with the highest score is the classification result of the neural
network.
For a logits vector y and a target class number t, we define the Carlini-Wagner (CW) loss [2] as the score of the target
class subtracted by the maximal score of other classes:
LCW (y, t) = yt −max
i6=t
yi (1)
Therefore the neural network classifies x as an instance of class t if and only if LCW (NN (x, W ) , t) > 0, assuming
no two classes have equal scores.
Adversarial robustness of a neural network is defined for an input x0 and a perturbation bound , such that the
classification result is stable within allowed perturbations:
∀x ∈ Adv (x0) : LCW (NN (x, W ) , t0) > 0 (2)
where t0 = argmax NN (x0, W )
In this work we focus on `∞-bounded perturbations:
Adv (x0) = {x | ‖x− x0‖∞ ≤  ∧ minx ≥ 0 ∧ maxx ≤ 1} (3)
Exact verification checks for given x0 and W whether (2) holds. We adopt the small convolutional neural network
architecture from [29] and the MIPVerify verifier of [15], since they are both open source and deliver the fastest exact
verification that we are aware of for real-valued neural networks. In MIPVerify the computation of NN (x, W ) is
formulated as a set of MILP constraints. The objective can be encoded in two ways:
• Closest: checking if (min ‖x− x0‖∞) ≤  under the constraint LCW (NN (x, W ) , t0) ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
• Worst: checking if (minLCW (NN (x, W ) , t0)) > 0 under the constraint x ∈ Adv (x0).
The robustness condition of (2) is satisfied if and only if the solver reports that the MILP formulation is infeasible. An
adversarial example x can be extracted from a feasible solution.
Due to the inevitable presence of numerical error in both the network inference system and the MILP solver, the exact
specification (i.e., a bit-level accurate description of the underlying computation) of NN (·, W ) is not clearly defined in
(2). We consider the following implementations that are accessible from the PyTorch [30] framework:
• NNC,M (·, W ): A matrix multiplication based implementation on x86/64 CPUs. Note that [29] reformulates
convolutions in the TensorFlow [31] model as matrix multiplications when invoking the verifier in their open
source code.
• NNC,C (·, W ): The default convolution implementation on x86/64 CPUs.
• NNG,M (·, W ): A matrix multiplication based implementation on NVIDIA GPUs.
• NNG,C (·, W ): A convolution implementation using the IMPLICIT_GEMM algorithm from the cuDNN li-
brary [32] on NVIDIA GPUs. It has similar numerical error as CPU algorithms.
• NNG,CWG (·, W ): A convolution implementation using the WINOGRAD_NONFUSED algorithm from the cuDNN
library [32] on NVIDIA GPUs. It is based on the Winograd [26] fast convolution algorithm, which has much
higher numerical error compared to others.
All these implementations use single precision floating point arithmetic for inputs and outputs of each layer while
exhibiting different numerical error behavior. We present in the following section our techniques for constructing
adversarial examples for all of them. Specifically, for a given implementation NNimpl (·, W ), our algorithm finds pairs
of (x0, xadv) represented as single precision floating point numbers such that
1. 0 ≤ x0 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ xadv ≤ 1
2. ‖xadv − x0‖∞ ≤ 
3. The MIPVerify verifier claims that (2) holds for x0
4. LCW (NNimpl (xadv, W ) , t0) < 0
Note that the first two conditions can be accurately specified for an implementation compliant with the IEEE-754
standard, because the computation only involves element-wise subtraction and max-reduction which incurs no accumu-
lated error. MIPVerify adopts a commercial solver Gurobi [33] for solving the MILP problem with double precision.
Therefore to ensure that our adversarial examples satisfy the constraints considered by the solver, we also require that
the first two conditions hold for x′adv = float64 (xadv) and x
′
0 = float64 (x0) that are double precision representations
of xadv and x0.
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Figure 1: Change of Logits Vector Due to Small Single-
element Input Perturbations
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Figure 2: Distribution of Difference Relative to NNC,M of
First Layer on MNIST Test Images
3 Constructing Adversarial Examples
3.1 Empirical Characterization of Implementation Numerical Error
To guide the design of our attack algorithm we present statistics about numerical error of different implementations.
To investigate local error behavior, we select the first robust test image x verified by MIPVerify on MNIST and present
in Figure 1 a plot of ‖NN (x+ δ, W )−NN (x, W )‖∞ against −10−6 ≤ δ ≤ 10−6, where the addition of x + δ is
only applied on the single input element that has the largest gradient magnitude. We observe that the change of the
logits vector is highly nonlinear with respect to the change of the input, and a small perturbation could result in a large
fluctuation. The WINOGRAD_NONFUSED algorithm on NVIDIA GPU is much more unstable and its variation is two
magnitudes larger than the others.
We also evaluate all the implementations on the whole MNIST test set and compare the outputs of the first layer (i.e.,
with only one linear transformation applied to the input) against that of NNC,M, and present the histogram in Figure 2.
It is clear that different implementations usually have different error behavior, and again NNG,CWG induces much
higher numerical error than others.
These observations inspire us to construct adversarial images for each implementation independently by applying small
random perturbations on an image close to the robustness decision boundary. We present the details of our method in
Section 3.2.
3.2 A Method for Constructing Adversarial Examples
Given a network and weights NN (·, W ), a natural image xseed from the test set that is provably robust under -bounded
`∞ perturbations, and an actual implementation of the network NNimpl (·, W ), we construct an adversarial input pair
(x0, xadv) in three steps:
1. We search for a coefficient α ∈ [0, 1] such that x0 = αxseed is provably robust but (α− δ)xseed is not robust
for a small positive value δ. Thus x0 is still a naturally looking image because αxseed is roughly adjusting
brightness of the image, but x0 is close to the decision boundary of robustness. In an ideal situation a binary
search is sufficient to minimize δ, but we find that in many cases the MILP solver becomes extremely slow
3
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Table 1: Number of Successful Adversarial Attacks for Different Implementations
#quasi-adv / #tested NNC,M NNC,C NNG,M NNG,C NNG,CWG
MNIST 18 / 32 2 3 1 3 7
CIFAR10 26 / 32 16 12 7 6 25
Table 2: Adversarial Attacks for Different Implementations Allowing Modifying Softmax Bias
NNC,M NNC,C NNG,M NNG,C NNG,CWG
MNIST # attack 4 5 2 3 17min test acc 98.40% 97.83% 98.57% 97.83% 97.83%
CIFAR10 # attack 20 16 14 8 26min test acc 58.74% 58.74% 58.74% 58.74% 58.74%
when δ is small enough, so we start with a binary search and switch to a grid search if the solver exceeds a
time limit. We set the target of δ to be 1e−7 in our experiments and divide the best known δ to 16 intervals if
grid search is needed.
2. We find an adversarial image x1 that is close to the robustness decision boundary by using the MILP solver
and a binary search to find τ0, τ1 and x1 such that:
• x0 is still robust given a tolerance of τ0:
∀x ∈ Adv (x0) : LCW (NN (x, W ) , t0)− τ0 > 0
• x1 is an adversarial image given a tolerance of τ1:
x1 ∈ Adv (x0) ∧ LCW (NN (x1, W ) , t0)− τ1 < 0
• τ0 and τ1 are close:
τ1 − τ0 < 1e−7
For an ideal solver we could simply find the values by minimizing LCW (NN (x, W ) , t0) with the worst
objective without the need of running a binary search. However in practice we have observed that doing a
binary search is more reliable in finding close τ0, τ1 pairs due to the numerical error in the solver. Another
issue is that the solver exceeds the time limit in some cases. We simply discard x0 if this happens at the
beginning of the binary search, and abort the search process if this happens later. We call the tuple (τ0, τ1, x1)
that can be found within the time limit a quasi-adversarial input.
3. We apply small random perturbations (on the scale of 2e−7) on x1 while projecting back to Adv (x0). If δ in
step 1 is small enough, then τ0 should be very close to zero and there is a good chance that such a perturbation
results in a negative CW loss, giving us the desired adversarial example. Algorithm 1 presents the details of
applying such perturbations.
3.3 Experiments
We conduct our experiments on a workstation equipped with two GPUs (NVIDIA Titan RTX and NVIDIA GeForce
RTX 2070 SUPER), 128 GiB of RAM and an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 2970WX 24-core processor. We train
the small architecture from [29] with the PGD adversary and the RS Loss on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. The
trained networks achieve 94.63% and 44.73% provable robustness with perturbations of `∞ norm bounded by 0.1
and 2/255 on the two datasets respectively, similar to the results reported in [29]. All of our code is available at
https://github.com/jia-kai/realadv.
Since our method needs multiple invocations of the computationally intensive verifier, for each dataset we only test
it on 32 images randomly sampled from the robust test images to demonstrate its effectiveness within a reasonable
total running time. The time limit of MILP solving is 360 seconds. Out of these 32 images, we have successfully
found quasi-adversarial inputs for 18 images on MNIST and 26 images on CIFAR10. We apply random perturbations
outlined in Algorithm 1 to these quasi-adversarial inputs (x1 from Section 3.2 Step 2) to obtain adversarial inputs for
the verified robust input image (x0 = αxseed from Section 3.2 Step 1). All the implementations that we have considered
are successfully attacked. We present the detailed numbers in Table 1.
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Algorithm 1 Attacking by Small Random Perturbations
Input: natural image x0
Input: target class number t
Input: initial quasi-adversarial image x1
Input: input perturbation bound 
Input: random perturbation bound u (default value 2e−7)
Input: number of iterations N (default value 1000)
Input: a neural network inference implementation NNimpl (·, W )
Output: an adversarial image xadv or FAILED
if NNimpl (·, W ) is NNG,CWG (·, W ) then
offset← 4
stride← 9
else
offset← 0
stride← 4
end if
xl ← max(x0 − , 0)
xu ← min(x0 + , 1)
while ‖x0 − xl‖∞ >  or ‖float64 (x0)− float64 (xl)‖∞ >  do
xl ← nextafter(xl, 1)
end while
while ‖xu − x0‖∞ >  or ‖float64 (xu)− float64 (x0)‖∞ >  do
xu ← nextafter(xu, 0)
end while
for i← 1 to N do
for (h,w)← (0, 0) to height(x1)× width(x1) step (stride, stride) do
x′1 ← uniform_perturb(x1, h+ offset : h+ stride, w + offset : w + stride, −u, u)
x′1 ← min(x′1, xu)
x′1 ← max(x′1, xl)
if LCW (NNimpl (x′1, W ) , t) < LCW (NNimpl (x1, W ) , t) then
x1 ← x′1
end if
end for
end for
if LCW (NNimpl (x1, W ) , t) < 0 then
return xadv ← x1
else
return FAILED
end if
{For NNG,CWG (·, W ), the convolutional layers in the network have 5× 5 filters, and the Winograd algorithm in
cuDNN produces 9× 9 output tiles for 13× 13 input tiles. Therefore we set this stride and offset value to make the
error at each location independent. For other implementations, we work on small 4× 4 tiles because the output error
are likely to get canceled if too many inputs are changed at once. }
Furthermore, since a large τ0 in the quasi-adversarial inputs makes our method less likely to succeed and it can result
from a large value of δ in step 1 due to the solver exceeding the time limit, we also evaluate the performance of
our attack algorithm when modifying the bias of the softmax layer is allowed. We decrease the bias of the target
class by τ0 to obtain a model that is still verifiably robust but easier to be attacked. Since modifying the bias would
affect test accuracy, we also evaluate the minimal test accuracy of modified models of the successful attacks for each
implementation. The results are presented in Table 2, showing that attack success rate is improved. Therefore our
method can be more effective if the verifier could be more efficient for images close to robustness boundaries.
We also present in Figure 3 the verified robust images on which our attack method succeeds for all implementations and
the corresponding adversarial images.
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Figure 3: Adversarial Images Found by Our Method
4 Possible Resolutions
Unless the verifier is able to model an exact specification of floating point arithmetic in the neural network inference
implementation, verification of NNs in the strictly exact sense is impossible in the presence of numerical error. Moreover
we have shown that because of numerical error, practical adversarial examples can be constructed for verified robust
networks. We propose two possible solutions:
1. Adopting over-approximation that is close to exact verification. For example the verifier could add an
error term bounded by maximum implementation error to variables for all the hidden units, similar to the
approach adopted by certification frameworks with sound floating point arithmetic [27, 24]. However this may
significantly complicate the verification problem. It is also not clear how to estimate a tight error bound for a
practical implementation with many engineering optimizations.
2. Quantizing the computations so the verifier and the implementation can be aligned. For example, if we require
all activations to be multiples of s0 and all weights to be multiples of s1, where s0s1 > 2E and E is a
very loose bound of possible implementation error, then the output can be rounded to multiples of s0s1 to
completely eliminate numerical error. Binarized neural networks [34] are a family of extremely quantized
networks, and their verification [35, 36] can be easily aligned with any sane implementation.
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